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ABSTRACT
Moral identity, moral personality, and moral emotion have all been suggested to
influence moral behavior individually, however, the results have been mixed and contradictory.
Furthermore, they have never been tested together to determine their relative contribution in
predicting moral decision-making. An anonymous online survey was administered to
undergraduate students (N = 432). Moral Reasoning was assessed by a series of six hypothetical
moral dilemmas. Participants were asked which of two choices they would prefer, one being a
more deontological choice, in other words, follow a principle such as “tell the truth”, and the
other being a more utilitarian choice, such as “lie to spare a person’s feelings”. In addition,
participants were asked how confident they felt that they made the right choice in each dilemma.
Other measures in the survey battery included Moral Identity which has two subscales, one for
Moral Importance, or the degree to which they feel being a moral person is important, and one
for Moral Expression, or the degree to which they try to behave consistently with their moral
values; a survey of Moral Emotion with subscales for Shame and Guilt; and a measure of Moral
Personality variables otherwise known as the dark tetrad: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, Sadism,
and Psychopathy. Age and moral expression were the only significant predictors of utilitarian
choices on hypothetical moral dilemmas. Although guilt was also correlated with utilitarianism,
it failed to be a significant factor when all variables were combined into one regression equation.
The degree of confidence participants expressed in their decisions on the hypothetical moral
dilemmas was correlated with shame and moral importance, however, none of the morality
variables was a significant predictor of confidence ratings when entered together into a
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regression equation. Possible reasons for the lack of significant results are explored and
suggestions for future studies are suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
Past studies have found links among such things as moral personality, moral identity,
moral emotions, and moral reasoning (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014;
Karandikar et al., 2019), however, the results have been mixed and contradictory (Aquino &
Reed, 2002; Chapman & Anderson, 2014; Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Tangney et al., 2007).
One reason for these inconsistent findings might be that these factors tend to be examined two at
a time, thereby clouding their combined effect. This study proposes to examine multiple factors
to determine their predictive validity regarding how people choose to respond to hypothetical
moral dilemmas.
A common way to measure an individual’s moral reasoning is by using moral dilemmas.
Moral dilemmas are hypothetical situations that force an individual to decide between two, often
extreme choices (McConnell, 2002). The situation has a moral value, i.e standards of good and
bad. Individuals tend to have a moral orientation; the perspective from which they approach
decision making (Levitt & Aligo, 2013). Depending on the moral orientation that an individual
has, the choices are identified as right and wrong. One such example is called the Footbridge
dilemma by Thomson (1976), a variation of the Trolley Dilemma:
Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. On the track ahead of him
are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get off the track in time. The
track has spur leading off to the right, and Edward can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately,
there is one person on the righthand track. Edward can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can
refrain from turning the trolley, killing five. (Thomson, 1976, p. 206)
The choice of turning the trolley to kill one person is considered to be a utilitarian choice,
whereas deciding to refrain from turning the trolley would be a deontological choice.
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Deontology suggests that the most ethical choice is the one that can be made into a
universal law and that respects its nature (Gray & Schein, 2012). Utilitarianism, on the other
hand, prioritizes the happiness of the greatest amount of people (Gray & Schein, 2012). The
choice someone makes suggests a series of meanings ascribed to terms such as “good” and
“bad.”
There are other ethical systems which someone could use to analyze a moral dilemma,
such as, egoism which equates the moral choice to be the one that benefits the self; virtue ethics
which emphasizes the role of virtue, character, sense of honesty and practical wisdom; and
pragmatism where an action is deemed morally right if it is practical, logical, and useful. For the
sake of this thesis, the focus will be mostly on the utilitarian versus deontological framework
because it is the common approach adopted in many studies about morality. Specifically, this
framework includes consequentialism (focus on individual rights) and formalism (focus on
common good) which are often used as synonyms for deontology, with its emphasis on rules and
principles of justice, and utilitarianism, with its emphasis on promoting happiness to the greatest
number of people (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007).
In addition, this thesis seeks to examine whether the responses to moral dilemmas varies
as a function of other factors such as moral identity, moral emotions, and personality. Further,
the populations of studies in prior research have mostly been inmates, clinical, and subclinical
samples. Whether the findings from these studies can be replicated with non-clinical participants
will also be examined.
Background
Antisocial Personality Disorder appears in the Cluster B section of personality disorders
in the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013); individuals with this disorder show
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little remorse for the consequences of their acts and they fail to conform to social norms with
respect to lawful behavior (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Furthermore, people with
Antisocial Personality Disorder tend to be insensitive, cynical and disdainful towards the
feelings, rights, and suffering of others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Personality
disorders in Cluster B have been called “moral disorders” because of their significant
relationship to morality (Azimpour et al., 2019); in the case of Antisocial Personality Disorder it
would be “lack of empathy.” Psychopathy is described in the DSM-V as the pervasive pattern of
disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood and continues to
adulthood (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). That pattern is the essential feature of
Antisocial Personality Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This might explain
why these two terms share many similarities and are often used interchangeably, even though
they are not the same thing. Psychopathy also includes traits like lack of empathy, inflated
selfappraisal and superficial charm (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Many studies have
found that those who have Antisocial Personality Disorder and psychopathy tend to choose a
utilitarian standpoint when confronted with a moral dilemma such as the Trolley Dilemma
(Glenn et al., 2010; Koenigs et al., 2012; Wrenn, 2020).
The utilitarian choice in moral dilemmas focuses on making the choice that maximizes
the happiness for the greatest amount of people, which is not necessarily an evil choice. The
utilitarian ethical system focuses on the consequences rather than the rules and norms, and since
individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy disregard any set of rules, it
logically follows that they would focus more on the outcomes of their choices. This does not
mean those who endorse utilitarianism disregard norms either. Rather utilitarians are placing
more importance in the consequences of actions, whereas those with Psychopathy and Antisocial
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Personality Disorder actively disregard them i.e they simply do not care about rules. More
importantly, it is also possible they are choosing the utilitarian choice not necessarily to
maximize the happiness and welfare for most people, but because they would choose to harm
anyone regardless of the benefits. In the trolley dilemma, the deontological choice (doing
nothing to divert the train) adheres to the Commandment “Thou shalt not kill.” Many might
choose this option even though it results in more deaths because it keeps them from actively
violating a rule and thereby decreases their feelings of guilt and responsibility. The psychopathic
or antisocial individual is neither overly concerned with rules nor guilt, so the logical choice
seems to be the utilitarian one of reducing the number of deaths by actively turning the track.
However, a person with a strong sense of morality (and guilt) could also make this choice
because they see the passive choice of doing nothing as cowardly and not living up to the moral
imperative of doing the right thing by saving the many over the one. Thus, the link between
psychopathy and utilitarianism should not be seen as proof of the moral inferiority of this
position. This is due to the fact that the motivation for the decision is more telling than the
decision itself in regard to the actor’s moral turpitude.
Moral Emotions
Moral emotions are said to be the motivational force behind moral decisions because they
help the individual understand people’s behavioral adherence to moral standards (Tangney et al.,
2007). Tangney and colleagues (2007) did a meta-analysis in which they reviewed all of the
current theories and research done on moral emotions, with a focus on shame and guilt, among
others, and where they fell in the realm of moral emotions. They determined that those emotions
were not equally moral emotions, in the sense that guilt was more adaptive and even beneficial
for the individuals whereas shame could be more destructive. To further illustrate the way they
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work, shame is associated with behaviors like attempts to deny, hide or escape the situation;
guilt, on the other hand, corresponds to more proactive pursuits like apologies, confessions and
undoing the consequences of the behavior. Nonetheless, the benefits of guilt can be lost if it fuses
with shame. Furthermore, shame-free guilt in college students was associated with less
likelihood of abusing drugs and alcohol, whereas the opposite happened with shame proneness.
Before making a decision, individuals are able to anticipate their emotional reaction (e.g., guilt,
pride, disgust). This suggests that emotional reactions can, indeed, exert a strong influence on
moral behavior.
Koenigs and colleagues (2012) conducted a study with inmates (N = 64) that were
classified, with the help of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, as low-anxiety individuals with
psychopathy, high-anxiety individuals with psychopathy, and individuals that did not meet the
criteria for psychopathy. They had to make moral judgements in a series of 24 moral dilemmas
that had a utilitarian choice and a deontological one. The dilemmas were also divided into
personal and impersonal variations. One of the features of these type of moral dilemmas is that
the personal option requires the person to be physically involved in the decision (i.e. push the
person onto the train tracks), whereas the impersonal one requires minimal involvement (i.e.
pulling a lever). There is also the emotional component that has been associated with the
personal choices (Koenigs, 2012). The results indicated that, specifically, low-anxiety
individuals with psychopathy were the ones that endorsed the utilitarian choice, suggesting there
is an alternative emotional/social deficit that underlies that particular subtype. The emotions of
shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride seem to function as an emotional moral barometer by
providing immediate feedback on our social and moral acceptability (Tangney et al., 2007). In a
way, moral emotions can function as the basis for moral identity.
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Moral Identity
In the general sense, an identity is described as a self-conception or a self-definition; it is
a combination of old and new identification fragments (Erikson, 1964a). Moral identity is
described as a specific kind of identity that revolves around the moral aspects of oneself and the
extent to which being a moral person is important to the self-identity (Hardy & Carlo, 2011;
Bergman, 2002). It also acts as a self-regulatory mechanism that sets the standard for the
individual’s behavior and motivates moral action (Erikson, 1964b). Aquino and Reed (2002)
argued that moral identity has two dimensions: internalization and symbolization. Internalization
is the degree to which moral traits are central to the self-concept, whereas symbolization reflects
the degree to which these traits are expressed publicly through actions in the world. Their
concept of moral identity is based on the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel et al., 1979;
Turner & Oakes, 1986); this theory links moral identity with traits that are associated with moral
behavior.
Glenn and colleagues (2010) examined the importance of moral traits in moral identity
and the extent to which they influence moral behavior. In the first study the participants were
adult volunteers (N = 170) that visited a website to fill out the questionnaires. The second study
was composed of the adult volunteers that did not participate in the first study (N = 214). They
found that individuals with self-reported psychopathy were less likely to describe their selfconcept using moral traits. If individuals believe that moral traits (e.g., being honest, kind,
compassionate) are central to describing their personal identity, then they have a strong moral
identity (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). Furthermore, if their self-concept does not involve moral
traits, then they may lack the motivation needed to behave morally (Glenn et al., 2010). This
suggests that moral identity can be a major motivational force behind moral behavior (Glenn et
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al., 2010; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Erikson (1964b) pointed this out by stating that an
individual has a strong need to act consistently with his or her identity.
Hertz & Krettenauer (2016) conducted a meta-analysis, which included 111 studies, in
order to examine the relationship between moral identity and moral behavior. Their concept of
moral behavior was identified as having two types of categories based on the motivational
processes of approach versus avoidance. For the actual analysis, three categories of moral
behavior were examined: avoidance of antisocial behavior, prosocial behavior, and ethical
behavior. The specific measures were either observed or obtained through self-reports. The
results of the study suggested that moral identity predicted moral behavior, however the
predictive effect was small to moderate in size. Thus, moral identity does not appear to be a
strong predictor of moral behavior. Instead, it seems that moral identity tends to predict general
behavioral dispositions rather than actual behavior in highly circumscribed situations. Due to
these results, Hertz & Krettenauer (2016) determined that there is no reason to prioritize moral
identity as a predictor at the expense of other factors i.e. moral emotions and moral judgement.
Instead, it should be taken into consideration in a broader conceptual framework where it
interacts with other personological and situational factors that bring about moral actions.
Lefebvre and Krettenauer (2019) conducted a meta-analysis (N = 57) examinating the
relationship between moral identity and moral emotions. They took a close look at both selfevaluative emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, pride) and other-evaluative emotions (e.g., empathy,
contempt, moral outrage). Self-evaluative emotions were defined as representations of emotional
inconsistencies within the self; thus they impact the self. Other-evaluative emotions are rooted in
the notion that morality binds not only to the self but also to everyone in the individual’s moral
community and are usually experienced when observing others engaging in moral and immoral
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behavior. Lefebvre and Krettanuer (2019) found that self-evaluative emotions are not as strongly
related to moral identity as other studies might suggest (c.f., Kingsford, 2018). However, moral
identity does seem to amplify moral emotions such as guilt, shame, pride, and empathy.
Moral Personality
The personality trait of Machiavellianism is part of the Dark Triad, along with
narcissism, and psychopathy. The Dark Triad is described as a set of socially malevolent
personality traits that are different but still overlap with each other (Furnham, 2013). This could
be due to a common underlying characteristic such as tendencies toward self-promotion,
emotional coldness, duplicity, and aggressiveness (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Narcissism is
described as an exaggerated feeling of superiority, a high level of self-centeredness and self-love
(Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014). Psychopathy’s main elements include high impulsivity and
thrill-seeking along with low empathy and anxiety (Paulhus & Williams, 2002).
Machiavellianism is based on the writings of 16th century philosopher Nicolo
Machiavelli, the political advisor of the Florentine Medici family. He heavily advised the use of
force by a monarch to instill enough fear so that the citizens would have no choice but to obey.
This is the reason Machiavellianism is described as “the manipulative personality” and consists
of traits such as the exploitation of others, a cynical disregard for morality, the use of strategic
manipulation, and a focus on self-interest and deception (Wrenn, 2020). Furthermore, it involves
interpersonal behaviors such as flattery and lying with the purpose of gaining prestige and
success (Wrenn, 2020). The goal that follows from the manipulation of others in Machiavellian
behavior, is often for personal gain, despite the harm it may cause to those that are involved
(Wrenn, 2020). Paulhus & Williams (2002) found that Machiavellianism was strongly correlated
to psychopathy. Psychopathy in general was more strongly correlated to Machiavellianism and
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narcissism, which made the researchers believe that psychopathy might be the core feature of
dark personalities. Studies have been conducted to analyze how the Dark Triad traits interact
with moral dilemmas (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014; Karandikar et al.,
2019).
Wrenn (2020) examined the relationships among the individual dimensions of the Dark
Tetrad and moral decision making. The Dark Tetrad is similar to the Dark Triad with the
addition that it includes sadism. In this thesis, the Dark Tetrad will be utilized as opposed to the
Dark Triad, as the influence of sadism in moral dilemmas has not been widely explored. Sadism
is the engagement or intention to engage in cruel, demeaning, and aggressive behaviors for the
purpose of pleasure or dominance (Plouffe et. al., 2017). In this study, impersonal and personal
moral dilemmas were administered to undergraduate student participants (N = 212) along with
two measures for each of the Dark Tetrad constructs. The difference between the personal and
impersonal choices lays in whether physical force is involved. Taking the Footbridge dilemma as
an example, the utilitarian choice is considered personal because it requires the individual to
push someone onto the train tracks. In order to make it impersonal, instead of pushing someone,
the individual could pull a lever, thus avoiding physical contact. It was found that individuals
who scored high on the Dark Tetrad, specifically Machiavellianism and psychopathy, were more
likely to deem it morally permissible to sacrifice one person to save five. Wrenn (2020)
explained that results could have been driven by the distinction of defining behavior as “morally
right” versus “permissible”; regarding a behavior as permissible does not give any indications
whether the individual genuinely believes the behavior is morally right or wrong.
Karandikar and colleagues (2019) also examined the association of the Dark Tetrad traits
with moral dilemmas and moral foundations. Their participants (N = 355) were adults recruited

9

through an online website; they were given moral dilemmas as well as one measure for each
construct of the Dark Tetrad. Their concept of moral judgements was based on the moral
foundations of harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and
purity/sanctity. It was suggested that individuals with these dark traits might have chosen
utilitarian responses due to their lower concern for moral values considering the content of the
selected moral dilemmas incorporated the welfare and active or passive harm to others (Bartels
& Pizarro, 2011; Karandikar et al., 2019).
Bartels and Pizarro (2011) approached this conundrum differently than previous studies. Instead
of directly linking psychopathy and other personality disorders to utilitarianism, they
administered a battery of personality assessments to undergraduate student participants (N = 208)
as well as moral dilemmas with utilitarian and non-utilitarian alternatives to examine which
personality traits were more associated with a utilitarian judgement. Bartels and Pizarro (2011)
predicted that the variability on the personality traits that display a devaluation of life, emotional
callousness and manipulativeness would be able to predict a utilitarian preference. In the context
of subclinical populations, a preference for utilitarian choices could be due to either a tendency
to favor rational deliberation when making moral decisions or a muted aversion to causing a
person’s death such as that observed in brain-damaged patients. Their results suggested that
those who scored higher on measures of Machiavellianism and psychopathy also indicated a
preference for utilitarian responses in moral dilemmas. However, they also claimed that their
study illustrated that sacrificial moral dilemmas failed to distinguish those who endorsed a
utilitarian choice because of an emotional deficit or a genuine concern for the welfare of others.
Rationale
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The literature has explored several different aspects of morality and how they interact
with personality disorders and dark personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Djeriouat &
`Trémolière, 2014; Furnham, 2013; Glenn et al., 2010; Karandikar et al., 2019; Koenigs et al.,
2012; Paulhus & Williams, 2005; Wrenn, 2020). Other studies have explored the connections
that exist between different morality areas, such as moral identity and moral emotions (Aquino &
Reed, 2002; Chapman & Anderson, 2007; Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Lefebvre & Krettenauer,
2019; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Tangney et al., 2007). Connections between moral identity,
moral emotions and personality had been reported, however some studies encountered weak
and/or mixed results (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Chapman & Anderson, 2014; Hertz & Krettenauer,
2016; Tangney et al., 2007). The reasons for these inconsistencies could be because they all used
one factor of morality in order to predict moral reasoning. Taking into consideration all of the
studies reviewed in this thesis, it was suggested that the process of moral reasoning was
dependent upon the following factors: moral emotions, moral identity, and moral personality
traits.
Because morality had been shown to be a multi-faceted construct, it was measured in this
thesis as such rather than a single dimension. This approach was suggested in other studies that
had obtained mixed results and thus concluded that additional factors should be taken into
consideration when measuring morality (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Chapman & Anderson, 2014;
Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Tangney et al., 2007).
It was hypothesized that:
1)

Moral personality (the Dark Tetrad), moral emotions (guilt and shame) and moral

identity (moral importance and moral expression) together would predict moral reasoning
(Utilitarian or Deontological) better than any one of them alone.
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2)

Moral identity would better predict the confidence ratings on the moral dilemmas

scale than moral personality or moral emotions.
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METHODS
Participants
This study included 432 participants that were recruited from a large pool of
undergraduate students at a large metropolitan university in the southeastern United States. The
age of participants ranged from 18 to 51 (Mage = 19.90, SD = 3.88). The gender breakdown
included 68.5% females, 28.8% males, 1.8% non-binary, 0.2% transgender, and 0.2% other. The
ethnic breakdown included 57.4% White, 19.6% Hispanic, 8.3% Black, 8.8% Asian or Pacific
Islander, 0.2% Native American or Alaskan Native, and 5.6% Mixed or Other. The breakdown
of education included 50.9% freshmen, 17.6% sophomores, 19.6% juniors, 11.3% seniors, and
0.5% non-degree seeking.
Measures
Demographic Questionnaire. Students were asked to report their age, sex, ethnicity, and
educational level.
Short Dark Tetrad (SD4; Paulhus et al., 2020). This questionnaire consisted of 28 items
that captured various traits of the Dark Tetrad: narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy and,
sadism. There were 7 items for the 4 subscales. Participants were asked to rank their agreement
with each statement using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 =
agree, 5 = strongly agree). Examples of items from each subscale are the following: narcissism
(“I have a unique talent for persuading people”), Machiavellianism (“It's not wise to let people
know your secrets”), psychopathy (“I tend to fight against authorities and their rules”) and, for
sadism (“Some people deserve to suffer”). Paulhus and colleagues reported a Cronbach alpha of
.80 for narcissism, .75 for Machiavellianism, .81 for psychopathy and .81 for sadism. The
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Cronbach alpha of each subscale within the current study were found to be .75 for narcissism,
.73 for Machiavellianism, .81 for psychopathy and .82 for sadism.
The Self-Importance of Moral Identity Measure (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed II &
Aquino, 2003). This measure had 10 items that assessed the participants moral identity. There
were 2 subscales with 5 items each: internalization (i.e. moral traits are central to the individual’s
identity), and symbolization (i.e. the extent to which moral traits are expressed publicly through
behaviors). To increase clarity, in this thesis the internalization scale will be referred to as moral
importance and the symbolization scale will be referred to as moral expression. Before the
participants started the measure, they were instructed to imagine someone who has 9 specific
moral traits. Next, they used a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither
agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) to indicate their agreement on the 10 items.
Example items for the subscales were the following: moral importance (“It would make me feel
good to be a person who has these characteristics”) and, moral expression (“I often wear clothes
that identify me as having these characteristics”). On Aquino & Reed’s study the Cronbach alpha
was .78 for internalization (moral importance) and .69 for symbolization (moral expression).The
Cronbach alpha for the moral importance and moral expression scales within the current study
was found to be .78 and .74 respectively.
Personal Feelings Questionnaire 2 (Harder & Zalma, 1990; PFQ2). This questionnaire
contains 16 items with 2 subscales of guilt and shame. Participants were asked to indicate on a 5point scale (0 = never, 1 = rarely, 2 = sometimes, 3 = frequently, 4 = always) how common the
feeling described in the item was for them. Example items for the subscales are the following:
guilt (“Worry about hurting or injuring someone”) and, shame (“Feeling humiliated”). Harder &
Zalma’s study had a Cronbach alpha of .72 for the guilt subscale, and .78 for the shame subscale.
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The Cronbach alpha was found to be .75 for the guilt subscale and .84 for the shame subscale for
the current study.
Critical Decision Making and Problem Solving Scale – Moral Dilemmas (Kurtines et al.,
1995). This measure consisted of 6 moral dilemmas, each with two choices modeled after the
ethical systems of utilitarianism (i.e. ethical choice is the one that brings happiness to most
people) and deontology (i.e. the ethical choice is the one that adheres to the norms/law). Taking
the first moral dilemma titled “Lying” as an example, the utilitarian choice would be “Don’t tell
the truth” whereas the deontological would be “Tell the truth.” In addition, participants were
asked to indicate on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all sure, 5 = extremely sure) how strongly they
believe the choice they picked was the right one. Two subscales were calculated, a Moral
Dilemma Confidence scale (the mean of all the confidence ratings), and a
Utilitarian/Deontological Continuum for the binary choices offered on each moral dilemma. For
this latter scale, the choice was multiplied by the confidence rating for each dilemma. For a
Deontological choice, the rating was multiplied by -1 (e.g., if a participant was very confident
(score 5) with a deontological choice, he would receive a score of -5) For a Utilitarian choice, the
confidence rating was multiplied by +1 (e.g., a utilitarian choice with a confidence rating of 4
would receive a score of 4). The scores were then averaged across dilemmas to provide a
continuum that ran from a minimum of -5 (extremely deontological) to a maximum of +5
(extremely utilitarian). The Cronbach alphas for the subscales were .61 for the Moral Dilemma
Confidence scale, and .39 for the Utilitarian/Deontological Continuum.
Procedure
This project was submitted to the author’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval.
Once the approval was received, it was submitted to the Psychology participant recruitment
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system known as SONA for further review and approval. SONA participants were mostly
students from psychology courses such as General Psychology. After the second approval was
received, the participants were able to choose this study from a list of all available studies being
conducted in the department of psychology. Participants received academic credit toward a
Psychology course and were able to access the study through the research participant website
(SONA). Those who selected this study clicked on a link that brought them to the Explanation of
Research in which they were offered the option to participate in the study or not. Those who
wanted to participate were directed to the surveys and those who did not want to participate were
redirected to the end of the survey where no data was collected, or credit given. The surveys
were given anonymously and online through Qualtrics. Students who did not wish to participate
in research but still wanted the equivalent credit were offered alternative assignments requiring
similar time and effort.
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RESULTS
Descriptive and Preliminary Analyses
The means, standard deviation, possible range and actual range for each measure is
reported in Table 1 (See Appendix C). A frequency distribution for dilemma responses is
presented in Table 2 (See Appendix D), and a correlation matrix with all the measures is
presented in Table 3 (See Appendix E). T-tests were conducted between each variable to test for
gender differences. Results indicate that on the Short Dark Tetrad (SD4), there was a significant
difference found for Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism subscales. Males (M = 3.40, SD
= .68) were found to have significantly higher scores on the Machiavellianism subscale,
compared to females (M = 3.20, SD = .62, t(430) = 3.01, p = .003). Additionally, males (M = 1.93,
SD = .65) were found to have significantly higher scores in psychopathy, compared to females
(M = 1.75, SD = .65, t(429) = 2.67, p = .008). Males (M = 2.88, SD = .76) had significantly higher
scores in sadism than females (M = 2.05, SD = .75, t(430) = 10.32, p< .001). Significant
differences in gender were also seen for the confidence average on the moral dilemma task.
Males (M = 3.69, SD = .61) were found to have significantly higher ratings of confidence in their
moral choices than females (M = 3.54, SD = .61, t(429) = 2.53, p = .012). Finally, t-tests were
conducted for the moral identity variables. Females (M = 4.64, SD = .48) were found to have
significantly higher levels of moral importance than males (M = 4.38, SD = .68, t(430) = -4.60, p<
.001). This relationship was true for moral expression as well, with females (M = 3.46, SD = .69)
having higher levels of moral expression than males (M = 3.07, SD = .72, t(430) = -5.29, p< .001).
To determine if scores on all variables differed by ethnicity and grade level, multiple oneway Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)s were conducted. Results indicate that there was a
significant difference in scores of guilt found between different ethnicities (F(5, 426) = 2.29, p =
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.045). LSD post-hoc tests indicate that Asian/Pacific Islander participants scored higher on guilt
compared to all other ethnicities analyzed. Additionally, significant differences between grade
levels were found for moral decision making (F(4, 422) = 3.87, p = .004) and confidence on moral
decisions (F(4, 425) = 3.62, p = .006). LSD post-hoc tests indicate that there were significant
differences between year at university and moral decision making. Juniors and seniors had
significantly lower scores than freshman and sophomores in moral decision making. More
specifically, juniors and seniors were more deontological in orientation, rather than utilitarian.
Additionally, juniors were found to have significantly higher confidence ratings on moral
decisions than freshman.
Main Analyses
Hypothesis one (Moral personality (the Dark Tetrad), moral emotions (guilt and shame)
and moral identity (moral importance and moral expression) together would predict moral
reasoning (Utilitarian or Deontological) better than any one of them alone) was analyzed using a
stepwise linear regression. Age and sex were entered on step 1, moral personality, moral
emotion, and moral identity were entered on step 2, with moral reasoning as the dependent
variable. The overall model was significant (R2 = .074, Adjusted R2 = .052, F(10,418) = 3.35, p <
.001). Moral reasoning was significantly predicted by age (β = -.174, t = -3.62, p< .001) and
moral expression (β = -.163, t = -2.98, p = .003). The negative beta weight suggests that higher
scores on moral expression were associated with more deontological responses on the moral
dilemmas. The other moral factors were not significant predictors, thus, hypothesis one was not
supported. This is because the framework that was proposed on this thesis was that moral
personality, moral emotions, and moral identity together would be able to predict choices made
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on moral dilemmas better than any of them alone. In these results, only one aspect of moral
identity, specifically the subscale of moral expression, was a significant predictor.
Hypothesis two (Moral identity would better predict the confidence rating on the moral
dilemmas scale than moral personality or moral emotions) was analyzed using a stepwise linear
regression. Age and sex were entered on step 1, moral personality (the dark tetrad) and moral
emotion (guilt and shame) were entered on step 2, and moral identity (moral importance and
moral expression) was entered on step 3, with confidence rating as the dependent variable. The
overall model was significant (R2 = .096, Adjusted R2 = .074, F(10,421) = 4.45, p < .001).
Confidence rating was significantly predicted by age (β = .206, t = 4.35, p< .001) and gender (β
= -.118 t = -2.27, p = .024). The hypothesis was deemed to be supported if (1) the addition of
Step 3 (moral identity) resulted in a significantly larger F statistic and (2) moral identity had a
larger beta weight and t statistic than moral emotions and moral personality. This hypothesis was
partially supported, as moral identity resulted in a larger F statistic and had a larger beta weight
and t statistic than moral emotions and moral personality. It was not fully supported because at
step 3 although moral importance was found to be significant (p = .037), moral expression was
not (p = .082).
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DISCUSSION
The framework presented in this thesis that moral emotions, moral identity, and moral
personality all together would best predict moral decision-making was not supported.
Specifically, age and moral expression were the only predictors of moral decision-making. In
Gotowiec and van Mastrigt’s (2019) study of the role of moral identity moral importance and
moral expression in prosocial behaviors, moral expression was found to be a stronger predictor
than moral importance; our results were consistent with this finding. Their study implemented
the same measure of moral identity as the one used in this thesis. The authors concluded that
moral expression has a significant effect on moral behavior regardless of whether the action is
done publicly or in private. Hertz and Krettenauer (2016), on the other hand, conducted a metaanalysis and found that moral identity did predict moral behavior, but the strength of the
relationship varied greatly depending on how moral behavior was measured. Moral behavior can
be measured by self-report, reports of others, or direct observation, and self-report can be either
reports of past behavior or intentions for future behavior.
Furthermore, shame proneness and moral identity (i.e., both moral importance and moral
expression) were significantly correlated with the confidence rating scale, whereas guilt
proneness and the subscale of moral expression were significantly correlated with the actual
choice made on the moral dilemmas. Shame was negatively correlated with the confidence scale
meaning that the more confident the participants were on their choices the less shame they felt.
Guilt was shown to be significantly correlated with the actual choices made by the participants
on the hypothetical moral dilemmas, specifically guilt-prone participants were more likely to
endorse utilitarian choices on said dilemmas (e.g., giving an extra coin to Dale, even though Sam
worked harder, just so he can pay for his mother’s surgery). Perhaps the more utilitarian
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participants were more likely to feel guilty about violating a moral principle, even though it was
done to help someone, whereas the more deontological participants were less likely to feel guilty
about causing harm to someone when they were following a moral principle. Tangney (1994)
studied the adaptive and maladaptive aspects of shame and guilt among undergraduate students
and found that self-reported moral behaviors (e.g., “I am honest with the way I deal with
people”) were correlated to guilt-proneness and unrelated to shame-proneness. Participants who
gave more deontological responses to moral dilemmas also tended to have higher scores on the
Moral Expression scale suggesting that those who favor the importance of following moral rules
despite negative consequences are more likely to see themselves as tending to act morally
(consistent with their moral principles).
A study by Kautsar and colleagues (2017) also analyzed the correlation between shame
and moral identity among undergraduate students. They found a small but significant correlation
between shame and moral identity. They theorized that perhaps shame only affects moral identity
when the individual has to evaluate how others judge his/her behavior (Kautsar et. al., 2017).
This is similar to the current thesis, as participants were asked to indicate on a confidence scale
how sure they were of their choices in each of the moral dilemmas. Thus, their responses were
evaluated. According to Tangney (2007) shame invokes the individuals to evaluate themselves
and their actions, hence why they would incur in behaviors such as hiding and denying. This is
because shame makes the person focus more on how their behavior is going to be perceived,
rather than whether it’s morally good or wrong, thus it generates those type of responses (i.e.
hiding).
Regarding the moral personality traits, i.e., the Dark Tetrad, they did not have any
significant effect on moral decision-making. One possible explanation for this could be that the
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other predictors overpowered the effect that these traits could have had, or dark personality traits
do not actually influence moral decision-making. Svensson and colleagues (2017) mentioned in
their handbook on offender decision-making that individuals that do not have the capability of
experiencing shame and guilt lack the power to feel empathy. Lack of empathy is one of the key
features of the Dart Tetrad, thus considering how moral emotions had strong correlations with
the decision made on the moral dilemmas, perhaps the proportion of participants that did possess
these dark personality traits to any large degree was too small to have a significant effect on
moral decision-making.
Furthermore, the second hypothesis was not supported. It proposed that moral identity
better predicted the confidence rating on the moral dilemmas scale than moral personality or
moral emotions. This might have been due to the number of variables that were used in this
thesis. They might have suppressed the effects of the other variables. Another reason could be
that perhaps there was a common underlying variable in all of the measures. This idea is
consistent with the framework of this thesis in that these categories of morality did correlate with
each other in various ways. Hardy & Carlo (2011) referred to the moral emotions as the affective
bases of moral identity.
The moral dilemmas that we used were different from the Trolley Dilemma, which is one
of the most commonly used moral dilemmas. One of the key differences is that the Trolley
Dilemma could be described as a sacrificial moral dilemma, in the sense that there is a life or
death decision (e.g. kill one to save five). The moral dilemmas used on this thesis do not involve
any sacrifice and explore different situations of moral importance, such as lying, punishment,
and monetary issues. Due to the nature of the Trolley Dilemma, it is possible that it might elicit
different responses from the participants. The most significant predictor of choices on the moral
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dilemmas was moral expression (i.e. moral identity), thus it be could argued that non-sacrificial
dilemmas such as the ones used on this thesis, might be able to account better for moral
reasoning than others like the Trolley Dilemma.
On the moral dilemmas of this thesis, the utilitarian and deontological choices were
divided equally. The dilemmas that represented situations that are commonly frowned upon in
our society (e.g. Stealing, Lying, Punishment), produced more deontological responses from the
sample. On the other hand, the more morally ambiguous situations (e.g. Fair Day’s Pay,
Breaking A Promise, You Broke It You Bought It) elicited more utilitarian responses.
In this thesis, the participants were not as consistent in their choices as the literature on
moral decision-making suggested. The low internal consistency of the dilemmas used in this
study (alpha = .39) suggests that participants were extremely inconsistent in the way they
responded to each dilemma. Rather than consistently responding in a utilitarian or deontological
manner, many participants went with principle (deontological) on one dilemma and
consequences (utilitarian) on another. This would be less apparent in a study that relied on only
one dilemma (e.g., the train dilemma), and suggests that perhaps most people are more
pragmatic, balancing the importance of upholding principles while not doing harm; weighing and
measuring how much harm is tolerable in order to uphold a principle. Other possible reasons for
this inconsistency in response patterns could be because our sample consisted heavily of
freshman undergraduate students as compared to other studies that involved individuals who
were inmates or were diagnosed with a personality disorder. On the other hand, different ways to
measure moral decision-making are still being developed. The framework that was proposed did
not work in that many of the theorized predictors of moral choice did not pan out. These findings
combined with the fact that other studies that were discussed in the literature review of this
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thesishave had contradictory results suggests that much more research is needed to clarify these
issues. Perhaps it is the nature of moral decision-making and the different influences it has that
makes it complicated to measure.
Limitations and Future Studies
The limitations of this thesis included the fact that the participants used self-report to
respond to the survey. This is a limitation because it relies on both the accuracy and honesty of
the participants in assessing themselves. Collateral reports from significant others and/or clinical
interviews can sometimes be helpful to insure the accuracy of self-assessments. Another
limitation was that the analysis was conducted at a single point in time, therefore it might not
capture the intra-individual range of responding (e.g., on good days versus bad) nor is it able to
evaluate growth and change over time. Longitudinal studies might be helpful in this regard. In
addition, most of the sample was freshman college students, with a mean age of approximately
19 years old. One study that had a sample of both undergraduate and graduate students,
suggested that formal education positively influences moral development (Bateman, 1998). The
sample used on this thesis most likely hasn’t had a formal experience with ethical issues, hence
their moral development is probably still evolving. Another limitation is the correlational nature
of the data analyses which precludes any definitive causal explanations. Again, longitudinal
studies would be helpful to address this. Finally, a common limitation in studies of this nature is
that the moral dilemmas used in this thesis were hypothetical situations, which might not indicate
how participants would react if they were confronted with similar situations in real life. This is a
harder limitation to address because it would be ethically unacceptable to place people in real life
dilemmas. At best we can question people about past real life more decisions made, but this type
of study would be limited by retrospection. However, such studies while not being definitive

24

would still enhane the literature that has leaned heavily and exclusively on hypothetical moral
decision making.
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EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH
Title of Project: Moral Identity
Principal Investigator: Dr. Steven L. Berman
Co-Principal Investigator: Adriana Seda, Reilly Branch

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.
We are interested in examining your sense of morality. You will be asked to answer questions
about your moral values and what you might do in certain hypothetical moral dilemmas. Please
be assured that your responses will be kept completely confidential and no identifiable
information will be collected.
The survey should take you around 30 minutes to complete.
You will receive SONA credits for your participation. If you choose not to participate, you can
complete an alternate assignment of equal time and effort for equal credit through your
psychology course.
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You are free to withdraw your consent and
discontinue participation in this study at any time without prejudice or penalty. Your decision to
participate or not participate in this study will in no way affect your relationship with UCF,
including continued enrollment, grades, employment, or your relationship with the individuals
who may have an interest in this study.
You must be a UCF student and 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or please contact Reilly Branch (reillybranch@knights.ucf.edu), Co-Principal
Investigator, or Dr. Steven Berman (steven.berman@ucf.edu), Principal Investigator.
IRB contact about your rights in this study or to report a complaint: If you have questions
about your rights as a research participant, or have concerns about the conduct of this study,
please contact Institutional Review Board (IRB), University of Central Florida, Office of
Research, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at
(407) 823-2901, or email irb@ucf.edu.

UCF HRP-254 Form v.5/1/2020
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for All Study Variables
Mean

SD

Possible
Range

Actual Range

Machiavellianism

3.26

.64

1.00 – 5.00

1.00 – 5.00

Narcissism

3.02

.65

1.00 – 5.00

1.14 - 5.00

Psychopathy

1.80

.65

1.00 – 5.00

1.00 – 5.00

Sadism

2.30

.84

1.00 – 5.00

1.00 – 5.00

Shame

2.72

.68

1.00 – 5.00

1.00 – 5.00

Guilt

2.59

.70

1.00 – 5.00

1.00 – 5.00

Dilemma Confidence

3.58

.58

1.00 – 5.00

2.00 - 5.00

Utilitarianism

-.26

1.76

-5.00 – +5.00

-5.00 - +4.17

Moral Importance

4.56

.56

1.00 – 5.00

1.00 – 5.00

Moral Expression

3.34

.72

1.00 – 5.00

1.00 – 5.00
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Table 2
Frequencies of Moral Dilemma Response

Moral Dilemma

Deontological

Utilitarian

Lying

58.3%

41.7%

Fair Day’s Pay

32.6%

67.4%

Breaking a Promise

45.7%

54.3%

You Broke It You Bought It

39.1%

60.9%

Stealing

69.6%

30.4%

Punishment

62.9%

37.1%

__________________________________________________________________
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix
1
1. Age

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

--

2. Machiavellianism

-.06

--

3. Narcissism

.04

.16***

--

4. Psychopathy

-.01

.21***

.25***

--

5. Sadism

-.12*

.37***

.06

.06***

--

6. Shame

-.15**

.18***

-.20***

-.20***

.08

--

7. Guilt

-.07

.06

-.18***

-.18***

.10*

.65***

--

8. Moral importance

.00

-.11*

.04

.04

-.35***

.03

-.04

--

9. Moral expression

.10*

-.11*

.26***

.26***

-.34***

-.05

-.05

.35***

--

10. Dilemma
Confidence

.22***

-.00

.03

.03

.00

-.12*

-.03

.12*

.11*

--

11. Utilitarian

-.19***

.04

-.07

-.07

.07

.07

.11*

.02

-.18***

-.15**

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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DEMOGRAPHICS
SEX: Indicate your gender
• Male
• Female
• Transgender
• Other (explain)
AGE: Type your age
ETHNICITY: Select the ethnic/racial identifier that best describes you:
• White, non-Hispanic
• Black, non-Hispanic
• Hispanic or Latino/a
• Asian or Pacific Islander
• Native American or Alaskan Native
Mixed ethnicity or Other (Specify):______________________
EDUCATION: Indicate year in school
• Freshman
• Sophomore
• Junior
• Senior
• Non-degree Seeking
• Graduate Student
• Other
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SHORT DARK TETRAD (SD4)
Rate your agreement with each statement using a 5-point scale:
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly Agree
Disagree

Neutral

Agree

2

3

4

5

IDENTITY 1: “CRAFTY”
1.
It's not wise to let people know your secrets.
2.
Whatever it takes, you must get the important people on your side.
3.
Avoid direct conflict with others because they may be useful in the future.
4.
Keep a low profile if you want to get your way.
5.
Manipulating the situation takes planning.
6.
Flattery is a good way to get people on your side.
7.
I love it when a tricky plan succeeds.
IDENTITY 2: “SPECIAL”
8.
People see me as a natural leader.
9.
I have a unique talent for persuading people.
10.
Group activities tend to be dull without me.
11.
I know that I am special because people keep telling me so.
12.
I have some exceptional qualities
13.
I'm likely to become a future star in some area.
14.
I like to show off every now and then.
IDENTITY 3: “WILD”
15.
People often say I'm out of control.
16.
I tend to fight against authorities and their rules.
17.
I’ve been in more fights than most people of my age and gender.
18.
I tend to dive in, then ask questions later.
19.
I've been in trouble with the law.
20.
I sometimes get into dangerous situations.
21.
People who mess with me always regret it.
IDENTITY 4: “MEAN”
22.
Watching a fist-fight excites me.
23.
I really enjoy violent films and video games.
24.
It's funny when idiots fall flat on their face.
25.
I enjoy watching violent sports.
26.
Some people deserve to suffer.
27.
Just for kicks, I’ve said mean things on social media.
28.
I know how to hurt someone with words alone.
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THE SELF-IMPORTANCE OF MORAL IDENTITY MEASURE
Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person:
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest and Kind.
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment,
visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person
would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like,
answer the following questions.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.

1

2

3

4

5

2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I
am.

1

2

3

4

5

3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.

1

2

3

4

5

4. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics.

1

2

3

4

5

5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me
as having these characteristics.

1

2

3

4

5

6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these
characteristics.

1

2

3

4

5

7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.

1

2

3

4

5

8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my
membership in certain organizations.

1

2

3

4

5

9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have
these characteristics.

1

2

3

4

5

10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.

1

2

3

4

5
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PERSONAL FEELINGS QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: For each of the following listed feelings, to the left of the item number, please place
a number from 0-4 reflecting how common the feeling is for you.
0

1

2

3

4

Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Frequently

Always

1. Embarrassment

0

1

2

3

4

2. Mild guilt

0

1

2

3

4

3. Feeling ridiculous

0

1

2

3

4

4. Worry about hurting or injuring someone

0

1

2

3

4

5. Self-consciousness

0

1

2

3

4

6. Feeling humiliated

0

1

2

3

4

7. Intense guilt

0

1

2

3

4

8. Feeling “stupid

0

1

2

3

4

9. Regret

0

1

2

3

4

10. Feeling “childish”

0

1

2

3

4

11. Feeling helpless, paralyzed

0

1

2

3

4

12. Feeling of blushing

0

1

2

3

4

13. Feeling you deserve the criticism for what
you did

0

1

2

3

4

14. Feeling laughable

0

1

2

3

4

15. Feeling disgusting to others

0

1

2

3

4

16. Remorse

0

1

2

3

4
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CRITICAL DECISION MAKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING SCALE – MORAL
DILEMMAS
Part 1: Critical Thinking (Items I-IV)
I. Lying
The adventures told here begin on a fine morning, early in the spring. Rob, the more
enterprising of the three, had decided to try a hand at farming. Rob had purchased a few acres of
farmland not far from where they lived and, because Hobbits are a close knit people, Sam and
Dale volunteered to help get the farm started.
As they were walking along the road to the farm, Rob and Sam began talking about Sam’s
father. Sam had been on a trip to a far away land that took several weeks. While he was away,
his father had become seriously ill of an incurable disease and had died. Sam did not find out
about his father’s death until he returned. Because Hobbits are very close, Rob had spent the last
few days taking care of Sam’s father. Sam’s father had suffered a great deal during his last few
days. Rob and Sam were talking about his father, and Sam asked Rob how his father’s last days
had been and if he suffered much. Rob thought about what to tell Sam. On the one hand, he
could tell Sam the truth, that his father had suffered greatly during his last days. Now, Rob knew
that Sam felt very bad about his father’s death and telling him that he had suffered would only
make him feel worse. On the other hand, he could tell Sam that his father had not suffered very
much. This would not be the truth, but Sam would probably not feel as bad if he did not think
his father had suffered. Sam would never find out the truth if Rob did not tell him because there
was no one else with his father during the last days. Rob was not sure about what to do so he
considered his choices. On the one hand, he felt he had a duty or obligation to tell Sam the truth
even though it would it would hurt him. On the other hand, he felt that by not telling him the
truth he would spare him some pain.
If you were Rob, what would you do?
a) Tell the truth.
b) Don’t tell the truth.
On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = Not at all sure and 5 = Extremely sure, how strongly do you
believe this is the right choice?
1

2

3

4

Not at all
sure

5
Extremely
Sure

II. Fair Day’s Pay
Rob, Sam and Dale continued on their journey and soon arrived at the farm. The farm was
obviously going to need a lot of work. The three Hobbits set to work and the farm quickly began
to take shape.
As the day drew to a close, work on the farm stopped. Hobbits, we noted earlier, delight in
receiving as well as giving presents and Rob, grateful for the help of Sam and Dale, decided to
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surprise them each with a nice present. Rob had five gold coins that he wanted to give them as
presents for helping. A Hobbit gold coin is quite valuable. The trouble is that Rob could not
decide how to share the coins. Both Hobbits had worked all day but Sam had worked harder
than Dale. Rob felt he had an obligation to reward Sam more because he had worked harder than
Dale. However, Rob also knew that Dale had been saving money for an operation that his
mother needed to restore her eyesight, which was failing rapidly. Dale needed only three more
gold coins. Rob was not sure about what to do so he considered his choices. On the one hand,
he could give Dale three coins and Sam two, even though Sam had worked harder than Dale.
That way Dale would have enough for his mother’s operation. On the other hand, he could give
Sam three coins and Dale two, even though Dale needed the extra coin for the operation. That
way Sam would be rewarded for his extra work.
If you were Rob what do you think you would do?
a) Give three to Dale and two to Sam.
b) Give three to Sam and two to Dale
On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = Not at all sure and 5 = Extremely sure, how strongly do you
believe this is the right choice?
1

2

3

4

Not at all
sure

5
Extremely
Sure

Part 2: Critical Discussion (Items III – VI)
III. Breaking a Promise
The adventures told here begin on a fine morning, early in the spring. Rob, the more
enterprising of the three, had decided to try a hand at farming. Rob had purchased a few acres of
farmland not far from where they lived and , since Hobbits are a close knit people, Sam and Dale
volunteered to help get the farm started.
After a long day of work, the three Hobbits began to prepare dinner. And it was a splendid
supper indeed, for all of the hard work and fresh air had given the Hobbits a healthy appetite.
Later, while sitting on the porch, Sam told Rob that he had found a magic black mushroom in the
field. Black mushrooms were said to have many different types of powers. For example,it has
been said that one bite of a black mushroom could make someone feel very happy. Black
mushrooms, however, have also been said to make Hobbits act in strange ways, sometimes even
causing them to harm themselves. Now, while Sam had a warm and friendly disposition, he was
also noted for being very impulsive and for doing foolish things. Consequently, Sam asked Rob
to keep the black mushroom for him. However, before giving Rob the mushroom, Sam made
Rob swear a double solemn oath, which Hobbits take very seriously, to give him the black
mushroom back whenever he asked for it.
Later on in the evening, in the middle of a fitful sleep, Sam woke up. He had been feeling
very bad about his father, and he asked Rob to give him the black mushroom back because he
wanted to eat some. Rob was not sure about what to do so he considered his choices. On the
one hand, he felt that he had an obligation to give him the mushroom back because he had made
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a solemn promise to do so. On the other hand, he felt that if he did give it back Sam might do
something to hurt himself.
If you were Rob what do you think you would do?
a) Give the mushroom back.
b) Keep the mushroom.
On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = Not at all sure and 5 = Extremely sure, how strongly do you
believe this is the right choice?
1

2

3

4

Not at all
sure

5
Extremely
Sure

IV. You Broke It You Bought It
Work on the farm continued. There was much to be done and the Hobbits worked with great
enthusiasm. In fact, Dale and Sam even went so far as to go into town to borrow a plow from
The Merchant in order to speed up clearing the field. While they were plowing together in the
field, Sam began talking to Dale about the trip he had taken to a far away land, in spite of Dale's
protests that he should pay more attention to their task. Suddenly, the plow struck a huge
boulder and the blade broke. The plow was ruined. The Hobbits took it back to The Merchant
and The Merchant asked Rob who was going to pay for the plow. Now, Hobbits do not have a
formal court system in the same way that we "Big Folk" do. When a Hobbit violates one of "The
Rules," as they refer to their laws, which have been handed down since ancient times, it falls
upon the master of the house to serve as a combination policeman, judge, and warden. Because
Dale and Sam live on Rob's farm The Merchant demanded that Rob insure that he receive nine
gold coins for the broken plow.
After listening to The Merchant, Rob decided that his claim was justified and Sam and Dale
would have to pay for the plow. One would have to pay five coins and the other would have to
pay four, but he was not sure which one should pay more. To make matters worse, "The Rules"
prevented Rob from getting personally involved with the settlement. Sam had told Rob that he
could only afford to pay four coins for the plow because he needed to pay off the balance of the
mortgage on the house he owns in town. He had been saving all year to pay it off. The balance
due was one hundred gold coins and Sam only had one hundred and four coins. If he had to pay
The Merchant more than four coins he would not have enough left for his mortgage, and since it
was due next week he would lose his house. Rob was not sure what to do so he considered his
choices. On the one hand, he felt he had an obligation to make Sam pay more than Dale because
it was Sam's carelessness that caused the plow to break. On the other hand, if he made Dale pay
the extra coin Sam would not lose his house.
If you were Rob what do you think you would do?
a) Have Dale pay more than Sam.
b) Have Sam pay more than Dale.
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On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = Not at all sure and 5 = Extremely sure, how strongly do you
believe this is the right choice?
1

2

3

4

Not at all
sure

5
Extremely
Sure

V. Stealing
After they had finished their affairs with The Merchant, the Hobbits had dinner and went to bed.
They got up early the next morning and began working. While the Hobbits were working in the
field, a friend of Rob's came by with news of his mother. Rob's mother had a problem with her
eyesight. She needed an operation to restore her eyesight which was failing rapidly.
Unfortunately, Rob did not have the money for this operation. He needed one hundred gold
coins. Rob's friend told him that his mother's eyesight was getting worse and that she might go
blind. The only one who had that much money was Mr. Maggot, a miserly old Scrooge who
lived on the next farm. Rob went over to ask him for the money, and Mr. Maggot turned him
down. He said that he had worked and saved for a long time and that he wanted to keep his
coins. Rob left Maggot's farm, but while he was leaving he saw that Mr. Maggot was going in to
town for the afternoon. Rob had seen where Mr. Maggot kept his gold coins and he knew that he
could come back in the afternoon and steal the 100 coins. Mr. Maggot had a whole room full of
gold coins and would probably never even miss one hundred. Rob knew that there was no other
way for him to get that many coins. He wasn't sure about what to do so he considered his
choices. On the one hand, he felt he had an obligation to respect Mr. Maggot's right to keep the
coins. On the other hand, he knew that if his mother did not have an operation she would
probably lose her eyesight.
If you were Rob what do you think you would do?
a) Not take the coins.
b) Take the coins.
On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = Not at all sure and 5 = Extremely sure, how strongly do you
believe this is the right choice?
1

2

3

4

Not at all
sure

5
Extremely
Sure

VI. Punishment
Suppose that before Rob could decide what to do, Sam, who knew about Rob's mother, had
already taken the money, and that he had a friend help him. Together, they had taken 200 coins.
When Mr. Maggot got back from town he discovered right away that the coins where missing
(because it was his peculiar habit to count them three times a day) and went immediately to
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Rob's farm. At the farm he asked Rob to search the house and they found the 200 coins in Sam's
room where he had hidden them. Confronted with the evidence, Sam confessed that he had
indeed stolen them. Since Sam and his friend came under Rob's jurisdiction, Mr. Maggot
demanded that Rob punish them for stealing the coins, because Hobbits consider stealing a very
severe violation of "The Rules." Rob knew the standard punishment for an offense as severe as
stealing was to serve time with one's head and hands locked in the pillories in the town square as
a form of public humiliation. It was Rob's decision about how much time each Hobbit should
spend in the pillories.
After confessing, Sam said that he took the coins to give his half to Rob for his mother's
operation. Sam's friend, on the other hand, said that he took the coins so that he could use his
half to take a vacation trip that he had always wanted. Rob knew that stealing was a very serious
offense and he thought about how he might punish Sam and his friend. On the one hand, he felt
that he had an obligation to sentence them both to the same amount of time as punishment
because they had both committed the same offense. On the other hand, he could sentence Sam to
less time because he had taken the money in order to try and do some good.
If you were Rob what do you think you would do?
a) Punish Sam less than the friend.
b) Punish Sam and the friend equally.
On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = Not at all sure and 5 = Extremely sure, how strongly do you
believe this is the right choice?
1

2

3

4

Not at all
sure

5
Extremely
Sure

45

REFERENCES
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (5th ed.). https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425596
Aquino, K., & Reed II, A. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1423. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423
Azimpour, A., Derakhshan, Z., & Ghanbari, S. (2019). Morality and psychopathology:
Tendencies to personality disorders and some other mental disorders among individuals
with high and low moral identity. Iranian Journal of Psychiatry and Behavioral
Sciences, 13(1). doi:10.5812/ijpbs.14966.
Bartels, D. M., & Pizarro, D. A. (2011). The mismeasure of morals: Antisocial personality traits
predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. Cognition, 121(1), 154-161.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.05.010
Bateman, J. S. (1998). Ethical dilemma survey of undergraduate and graduate students (Order
No. 9923471). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses A&I; ProQuest
Dissertations & Theses Global. (304483029). https://www.proquest.com/dissertationstheses/ethical-dilemma-survey-undergraduate-graduate/docview/304483029/se2?accountid=10003
Bergman, R. (2002). Why be moral? A conceptual model from developmental psychology.
Human Development, 45(2), 104-124. https://doi.org/10.1159/000048157
Chapman, H. A., & Anderson, A. K. (2014). Trait physical disgust is related to moral judgments
outside of the purity domain. Emotion, 14(2), 341–348.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035120
Christie, R., & Geis, F. L. (1970). Studies in Machiavellianism. Academic Press.

46

Djeriouat, H., & Trémolière, B. (2014). The Dark Triad of personality and utilitarian moral
judgment: The mediating role of Honesty/Humility and Harm/Care. Personality and
Individual Differences, 67, 11-16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.026
Erikson, E. H. (1964a). Insight and responsibility: Lectures on the ethical implications of
psychoanalytic insight. W W Norton & Co.
Erikson, E. H. (1964b). Childhood and society (2nd ed.). W. W. Norton.
Furnham, A., Richards, S. C., & Paulhus, D. L. (2013). The Dark Triad of personality: A 10 year
review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7(3), 199-216.
https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12018
Gotowiec, S., & van Mastrigt, S. (2019). Having versus doing: The roles of moral identity
internalization and symbolization for prosocial behaviors. The Journal of Social
Psychology, 159(1), 75-91. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2018.1454394
Glenn, A. L, Koleva, S., Iyer, R., Graham, J., & Ditto, P. H. (2010). Moral identity in
psychopathy. Judgment and Decision, 5(7), 497-505.
Gray, K., & Schein, C. (2012). Two minds vs. two philosophies: Mind perception defines
morality and dissolves the debate between deontology and utilitarianism. Review of
Philosophy and Psychology, 3(3), 405-423. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0112-5
Harder, D. H., & Zalma, A. (1990). Two promising shame and guilt scales: A construct validity
comparison. Journal of Personality Assessment, 55(3-4), 729-745.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.1990.9674108
Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2011). Moral identity. In Handbook of Identity Theory and
Research (pp. 495-513). Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-44197988-9_19

47

Hertz, S. G., & Krettenauer, T. (2016). Does Moral Identity Effectively Predict Moral Behavior?:
A Meta-Analysis. Review of General Psychology, 20(2), 129–140.
https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000062
Kautsar, H. R., Septiana, E., & Salim, R. M. A. (2017). The correlation between shame and
moral identity among undergraduate students. In Diversity in Unity: Perspectives from
Psychology and Behavioral Sciences (pp. 241-246). Routledge.
Karandikar, S., Kapoor, H., Fernandes, S., & Jonason, P. K. (2019). Predicting moral decisionmaking with dark personalities and moral values. Personality and Individual
Differences, 140, 70-75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.03.048
Kingsford, J. (2018). The emergence of moral identity in middle childhood. (Doctoral
Dissertation).
Koenigs, M., Kruepke, M., Zeier, J., & Newman, J. P. (2012). Utilitarian moral judgment in
psychopathy. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(6), 708-714.
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr048
Kurtines, W. M., Berman, S. L., Ittel, A., & Williamson, S. (1995). Moral development: A coconstructivist perspective. In W. M. Kurtines and J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.) Moral
Development: An Introduction (pp. 337-376). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Levitt, D. H., & Aligo, A. A. (2013). Moral orientation as a component of ethical decision
making. Counseling and Values, 58(2), 195-204. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2161007X.2013.00033.x
McConnell, T. (2002). Moral dilemmas. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

48

Paulhus, D. L., Buckels, E. E., Trapnell, P.D., & Jones, D. N. (2020, online, open access).
Screening for dark personalities: The Short Dark Tetrad (SD4). European Journal of
Psychological Assessment. https://doi.org/10.1027/1015-5759/a000602
Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism,
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36(6), 556563. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(02)00505-6
Plouffe, R. A., Saklofske, D. H., & Smith, M. M. (2017). The Assessment of Sadistic
Personality: Preliminary psychometric evidence for a new measure. Personality and
Individual Differences, 104, 166–171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.07.043
Reed II, A., & Aquino, K. F. (2003). Moral identity and the expanding circle of moral regard
toward out-groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(6), 1270.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.6.1270
Reynolds, S. J., & Ceranic, T. L. (2007). The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on
moral behavior: an empirical examination of the moral individual. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 92(6), 1610. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.6.1610
Svensson, R., Pauwels, L. J., & Weerman, F. M. (2017). The role of moral beliefs, shame, and
guilt in criminal decision making. The Oxford Handbook of Offender Decision
Making, 6, 228.
Tajfel, H. (1959). Quantitative judgement in social perception. British Journal of Psychology,
50(1), 16-29.
Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1979). An integrative theory of
intergroup conflict. Organizational Identity: A reader, 56(65), 9780203505984-16.

49

Tangney, J. P. (1994). The mixed legacy of the superego: Adaptive and maladaptive aspects of
shame and guilt. In J. M. Masling & R. F. Bornstein (Eds.), Empirical perspectives on
object relations theory (pp. 1–28). American Psychological Association.
https://doi.org/10.1037/11100-001
Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior. Annual
Reviews Psychology, 58, 345-372.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145
Thomson, J. J. (1976). Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. The Monist, 59(2), 204-217.
https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197659224
Turner, J. C., & Oakes, P. J. (1986). The significance of the social identity concept for social
psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social influence. British
Journal of Social Psychology, 25(3), 237-252. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.20448309.1986.tb00732.x
Wrenn, Kayli, "Dark Tetrad Responses to Moral Dilemmas" (2020). UNLV Theses,
Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 3975.
http://dx.doi.org/10.34917/19412

50

